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Dupe Checklist System: Train-The-Trainer Self-Study Resource Material

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16. Abstract. The Resolution Procedures Training Program is an integral element of the Dupe Checklist System. The training program currently includes the Resolution Procedures Manual (RPM), Security Supervisor Initial Training -- Instructor's Guide, Security Supervisor Recurrent Training Program -- Instructor's Guide, Train-The-Trainer (TTT) Module and Video presentation: Passenger Interview. The Train-The-Trainer Self-Study Resource Material provides the trainer with additional background information material to enhance his/her knowledge and increased training level..

17. Key Words Aviation Security; Dupe Checklist Failed Checklist Answer, Passenger Service Agent, Security Supervisor		18. Distribution Statement This document is a record subject to the provisions of 14 CFR 191 et seq. Release of the information contained herein is prohibited without the express written approval of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, Federal Aviation Administration, or his designee.	
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1.0   INTRODUCTION

1.1   General

The Resolution Procedures Training Program is an integral element of the Dupe Checklist System. The training program currently includes the following documents:

    a.   Resolution Procedures Manual (RPM).

    b.   Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Initial Training.

    c.   Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Recurrent Training Program.

    d.   Train-The-Trainer (TTT) Self-Study Resource Material.

    e.   Video presentation: Passenger Interview.

The documents (with the exception of the TTT Self-Study Material) have been designed for classroom training of air carrier Security Supervisors and Passenger Service Agents (PSA). These documents may also be used for the training of other air carrier employees, such as skycaps and special services personnel who provide direct ground services to passengers. Additionally, in accordance with the air carrier's FAA-approved Security Supervisor training program, selected portions of the training material may be provided to trainees (Security Supervisor class participants) for home study.

1.2   Self-Study Material Use

This training material has been prepared for self-study by air carrier authorized trainers. Each trainer must complete the study of this material prior to conducting classroom instruction.

1.3   Train-The-Trainer (TTT) Resource Material Purpose

The Train-The-Trainer Self-Study Resource Material provides the trainer with additional background information material to enhance his/her knowledge and increase their training level.

1.4 Trainer Minimum Qualification Criteria

An authorized trainer must possess proper professional education and related experience. As a minimum, a trainer should have no less than two (2) years of recent experience in each of at least three (3) disciplines from the list enumerated below:

    a.   Air carrier direct passenger service in any capacity;

    b.   Certified Security Supervisor ;

    c.   Hands-on passenger profiling (profiler, supervisor and/or trainer);

    d.   Airport passenger screening operation (supervisor and/or trainer); and

    e.   Air carrier corporate security management.

In addition, a trainer should posses the following qualities:

    a.   Open-mindedness;

    b.   Constructive approach toward people and situations;

    c.   Patience; and

    d.   Knowledge of recent and current global and domestic political, social and military events, conflicts and trends.

Additional desirable background elements include:

    a.   College education;

    b.   Military or law enforcement experience;

    c.   Investigations experience; and

    d.   Teaching/training experience.

1.5 Training Material

Each trainer using the TTT Self-Study Material must have access to all of the documents referenced in Section 1.1 of this document.

1.6 Restriction Notice

Dissemination of the material included in this manual shall be restricted to authorized trainers and other individuals with an operational need-to-know, in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 191.

2.0 DOCUMENT ARRANGEMENT

2.1 Sessions and Duration

The self study training material is presented in eight (8) sessions. The material may be studied in any sequence.

Session	Subject	Estimated Duration (Self-study, in minutes)
I	Resolution Procedures Manual (RPM)	100
II	Dupe Checklist System Intent	20
III	Passenger Questioning	50
IV	Dupe Types and Duping Methods	50
V	Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Initial Training Program	150
VI	Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Recurrent Training Program	50
	Total estimated time: 420	

2.2 Session Layout

Each session is comprised of the following:

2.2.1 <u>Learning Objective and Resource Referral</u>

The learning objective is stated at the beginning of each session. Where appropriate, referrals to other documents of the Dupe Checklist System are provided.

2.2.2 <u>Text</u>

The text contains informational material and directions intended to increase trainer knowledge, maximize class effectiveness and enhance students interest.

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3.0   SESSIONS

3.1   Session I: Dupe Checklist System Intent

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    LEARNING OBJECTIVE                         │
│                                                              │
│   To enhance instructor knowledge regarding broad program goals. │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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3.1.1   General

The Dupe Checklist System ultimate intent is to identify passengers who may be carrying a bomb in their luggage without being aware of it.

Incidents involving bombs on airliners have always been very rare. Statistically, the chances that a passenger will even be targeted as a possible dupe are fewer than one in a million. It is important to realize that international terrorist groups have not engaged in extensive bombing campaigns against civil aviation. However, social and political developments, such as the emergence of U.S. domestic terrorism and the rise of non-traditional, ad hoc groupings of terrorists could lead to an increased frequency of bombings and attempted bombings. In this connection, it should be noted that, in January 1995, a group of terrorist conspirators in the Philippines had plans to put bombs on perhaps as many as 11 U.S. airlines operating in the Pacific region. The plot was thwarted when police happened upon the apartment in Manila which the conspirators were using as their base.

To be realistic, one should understand that in the modern world, the notion of an absolute solution to any problem simply does not exist. Terrorism or crime against civil aviation is no exception.

Convey to your trainees that the Dupe Checklist System, like many other security programs, has a broader scope than merely "catching the bomb." The system is designed to help PREVENT, DETER and DISPLACE crimes involving the use of duped passengers.

3.1.2   Prevention

The implementation of the Dupe Checklist System may prevent a bomb carried by a duped passenger from reaching its target (aircraft). For practical purposes such a crime prevention can only be measured by actual detection of a bomb possessed by a duped passenger.

3.1.3 Deterrence

Once implemented, the Dupe Checklist System should provide a level of deterrence against placing a bomb on board aircraft using a duped passenger. However, deterrence effectiveness can not normally be quantified or reliably measured. It can only be assessed.

3.1.4 Crime Displacement

In addition to detection, deterrence and prevention, the Dupe Checklist System has another goal: to help DISPLACE potential criminals or crimes to another target. The displacement factor is more likely to be effective against terrorist groups or organized criminals as such entities do not act at random. They act with careful preparations and much planning, including studying the intended target and evaluation of security procedures implemented to protect that target. The Dupe Checklist System is based on passenger participation. The procedures (i.e., checklist card completion, passenger interviews and baggage inspection) associated with the system are visible to the passengers and to the public. Such procedures are likely to be taken into consideration by a terrorist or criminal planning to dupe an air carrier passenger.

It is important to realize that the displacement factor may not be effective against small time or street type criminals as well as mentally unstable individuals planning to dupe a passenger. Typically, their criminal activities are not preceded by much planning or target surveillance, if any.

3.2 Session II: Resolution Procedures Manual (RPM)

LEARNING OBJECTIVE
To familiarize the instructor with all the procedures and other material included in the RPM.
REFERENCE MATERIAL
Resolution Procedures Manual (RPM)

STUDY THE ENTIRE RPM AND FAMILIARIZE YOURSELF THOROUGHLY WITH ALL OF ITS CONTENTS (SECTIONS AND APPENDICES)

3.3 **Session III: Passenger Interview**

<table>
<tr><td align="center">LEARNING OBJECTIVE

To enrich the instructor knowledge in passenger interview and related topics.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="center">REFERENCE MATERIAL

Security Supervisor Initial Training Program -- Instructor's
Guide, Section V: Passenger Interview Guidelines</td></tr>
</table>

3.3.1   <u>Organization and Multiple Failed Checklist Answers (FCAs)</u>

Passenger interview is a critical element of the resolution procedures. Experience plays a significant role in gaining proficiency in questioning. However, in the case of the Dupe Checklist System, such experience is not likely to be gained by many Security Supervisors prior to actual program implementation. This is a given situation.

Some important points to emphasize regarding questioning:

a.   Questioning requires organization.

b.   Each specific problem (FCA) should be addressed and resolved individually.

c.   Mixing questions addressing two or more subjects simultaneously is likely to extend the interview and may confuse the interviewer.

For example, a passenger may have two unresolved FCAs as follows:

a.   Item received to deliver.

b.   Bag has been out of the passengers possession.

In this example, it would be improper to ask a question such as "Please tell me under what circumstances you received this item and who watched your bag while not in your possession?" Instead, the FCAs should be addressed in sequence.

Occasionally initial questioning will reveal that two or more FCAs may be interrelated. In the example above, the passenger may supply answers indicating that the item to deliver was received from the same person who watched his/her bag. Such cases may require one line of questioning addressing both subjects. The interviewer has to ensure that each FCA is satisfactorily resolved.

3.3.2 Explanations, Courtesy and Passenger Cooperation

Experience in the international arena (outside of the U.S.) has shown that the vast majority of passengers fully cooperate with air carrier interviewers. The cooperation can be attributed to two main elements:

   a.   Well developed awareness and sensitivity of passengers to terrorism and aviation security.

   b.   The courteous manner in which the interviewers perform questioning.

Passenger awareness and sensitivity to aviation security issues may be developed over time under certain domestic or international social/political circumstances and media influence. While such circumstances do not continually affect the public in the U.S., passenger awareness to aviation security issues may be sensitized through proper pre-interview (and on-going, where appropriate) explanations. Passengers usually cooperate with air carrier interviewers if they know why they are being questioned.

Conducting the questioning in a courteous manner is another important element in achieving passenger cooperation. Under the title of "courtesy" we include using an appropriate choice of words (terminology) and proper application of softening statements (also called "softeners").

It is important that you emphasize to trainees the value of explanations and courtesy in achieving passenger cooperation.

3.3.3 Terms to Avoid

To minimize unnecessary passenger anxiety certain terms should normally be avoided during interviews. Unless absolutely necessary, avoid using terms such as TERRORISM, INTERROGATION, DUPE, BOMB, DETONATOR, BLASTING CAP, EXPLOSIVE, EXPLOSION, CRASH, HIJACKING, HOSTAGES, HAND-GRENADE, GUN, DYNAMITE, C-4, SEMTEX, TNT, etc. Instead, when necessary, use terms such as SECURITY, SAFETY, INTERVIEW, HARMFUL, DANGEROUS, HAZARDOUS, WEAPON, etc.

3.3.4 Basis for Interview and Security Inspection

The Dupe Checklist System is unique with respect to the reasoning behind the interview. The interview is based solely on answers checked off on the checklist card by the passenger. No verbal communication between the air carrier and the passenger is involved when completing the checklist card. The passenger is not subjected to external pressures.

The Dupe Checklist System assumes that all U.S. domestic passengers want to arrive safely at their destination. The passengers are not expected to willfully carry a bomb intended to blow-up in mid-air. It is assumed that passengers will supply honest answers on the checklist cards.

It is imperative that all interviewers bear in mind that interviews are based solely on FCAs voluntarily provided by the passenger. Passenger Service Agents (PSAs) and Security Supervisors should perform passenger interviews in a friendly manner, even when the questioning process leads to a decision calling for a security search of the passenger's baggage.

Although the decision to perform a security inspection of the passenger's baggage is based only upon the interview outcome, the passenger must be fully informed of the situation. The passenger must clearly understand why his/her baggage is to be subjected to a security inspection. Once again, a proper explanation to the passenger will go a long way.

3.4   Session IV: Dupe Types and Duping Methods

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LEARNING OBJECTIVE

To provide the instructor with educational facts gained in past incidents

</div>

3.4.1   Dupe Types

Based on experience gained outside of the U.S., the type of individual most frequently picked by terrorists to be duped had the following typical characteristics:

      a.   Single young adult.
      b.   Non-professional.
      c.   Limited education.
      d.   Limited financial means.
      e.   No permanent or stable occupation.
      f.   Foreigner or new to the area.
      g.   Limited or no contacts in area of current residency.
      h.   Limited or no contacts in flight destination area.
      i.   Dependency (financial, social and/or controlling substance).

This list reflects experience gained outside of the U.S. While discussing it in-class, remind trainees never to be "locked" on the list above. The list is provided for educational and discussion purposes only.

3.4.2   Methods to Dupe Passengers

Terrorist groups have been very creative in their successful and attempted methods to dupe passengers. It is interesting to note that occasionally items given to passengers were found not to contain bombs. Such situations have been assumed to be "dry-runs" initiated by terrorist groups or their sympathizers. Appendix A, Duped Passengers - Incidents Synopsis, provides examples of the duping methods below.

a.   Giving items to passengers at the airport.

Passengers have been approached by strangers at the airport terminals and offered gifts or asked to deliver packages at their destination. In some cases passengers were offered gifts just prior to entering the passport control/departure gates areas. Supposedly this has been done to prevent the passengers from disclosing information about the gifts received during the security procedures they had undergone at the check-in counter area (passenger profiling procedures).

b.   Romantic acquaintance.

Male terrorists have received assignments to develop intimate relationships with female individuals having the characteristics listed under Dupe types above. Such relationships were usually established over periods of six months to over two years. During this time the unsuspecting female partners developed a sense of trust in the their male "boyfriends." The female individuals were not aware of the affiliation of their "lovers" with terrorist groups.

Once the relationships matured to the right level of trust, the terrorist "proposed" marriage to his "girlfriend". In one case the girl proposed to the terrorist... In another case the terrorist sent his fiancee on a flight with a bomb in her bag while she was six months pregnant.

c.   Addiction to controlled substance.

Terrorists have taken advantage of individuals addicted to drugs. Unfortunately many such individuals are not very selective when it comes to methods to obtain funds to support their costly addiction.

In one case a young male agreed to deliver a suitcase on a flight to another a fictitious person for $500.00. The suitcase contained a bomb set to explode in mid air.

d.   Using contraband to fool the dupe.

Duped individuals have been tricked into believing they were involved in some illegal activities. Such individuals thought they were carrying contraband in their baggage.

e.   Customs avoidance cover up.

Some individuals used as dupes were given gifts (in one case a whole suitcase) to deliver to fictitious families at their destination. They were instructed not to admit receiving anything from anyone (if asked by air carrier or airport personnel). The passengers were told that if they admit carrying items for other people, they will have to pay high fees to the Customs service.

f.   Taking control of airport retail and service operations.

In the past, terrorist groups attempted to acquire airport based operations such as duty free shops and catering services using their own, apparently unrelated, financial entities. It was believed that the groups intended to use such businesses to gain access to aircraft on the ramp and dupe passengers using duty free items.

3.4.3   Other Options

Though not known to have been used by terrorists, a passenger may also be duped by planting a bomb in his/her baggage while the baggage is out of his/her sight. For example, overnight pick up for tour groups is common at some hotels. In this case passengers leave their baggage outside their rooms in the evening. They have no contact with their baggage until after they arrive at the airport the following day. Baggage may also be out of an owner's sight for extended periods while the passenger is on a bus tour or while the baggage is placed with a locker/storage service.

3.5   Session V: Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Initial Training Program

LEARNING OBJECTIVE
To provide the instructor with material and directions to maximize initial classroom training effectiveness and enhance students interest.
REFERENCE MATERIAL
Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Initial Training Program

3.5.1   Preparation

Study the entire Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Initial Training.

3.5.2.   Cross-Discussion of Topics

All topics discussed in the Dupe Checklist System/Resolution Procedures (Security Supervisor training program) are interrelated. Some identical topics are discussed several times in different sessions, and some are discussed from different angles. For example, FCAs are discussed repeatedly in each and every session.

The discussion of identical topics under different headings (sessions) is done for training purposes only and is essential to the understanding of the program.

3.5.3   Subject Adherence

Initial training is assumed to be a first time introduction of the subject matter (Dupe Checklist System and Resolution Procedures) to the trainees. Since training time is limited, the instructor should minimize discussions on topics other than those specified in the training program (Instructor's Guide and the TTT Self-Study Material). Experience has shown that many trainees demonstrate interest in subjects such as terrorist methods of operation, explosives and weapons. If necessary, remind trainees that such subjects are addressed in more detail in other parts of the Security Supervisor training program.

3.5.4   Security Supervisor Proficiency

Gaining experience and maintaining proficiency in the Dupe Checklist System and its associated resolution procedures is a problematic matter, as the system is only implemented under certain heightened security conditions. Until such security conditions are declared by the FAA, Security Supervisors cannot regularly practice and/or sharpen their interviewing skills. This fact needs to be stressed to the trainees during classroom sessions. Security Supervisors need to understand that the only way to maintain a certain degree of proficiency is by going through refresher-recurrent training sessions (conducted annually following initial training) and most importantly, by periodic review of the RPM.

3.5.5   Training Material

Prior to starting a training class the instructor should personally ensure that:

a.   All training material and aids required for each session are available in sufficient quantities.

b.   RPM and handouts are distributed to trainees <u>prior</u> to the beginning of class.

c.   Necessary equipment (e.g. video cassette player) is operable.

3.5.6   <u>Introduction of Sessions to Trainees</u>

Always start each session with a statement of <u>objectives</u> and <u>required accomplishments</u>. Both are defined in the training manual information grid at the beginning of each session.

3.5.7   <u>Points to Emphasize/Tips/Added Material (Per Session)</u>

a.   **Session I: Introduction**

    1.   Checked versus carry-on baggage

         Indicate to trainees that terrorists are more likely to dupe a passenger by placing a bomb in his/her checked baggage than in his/her carry on bag. The reason: passengers have the tendency to open their carry on bags and examine and/or use carry on items before and/or during the flight.

         From the terrorist operational standpoint placing a bomb in a passengers carry on luggage increases the probability of a failure due to early discovery of the bomb or the item housing the bomb.

    2.   Duped passenger types

         To add some interest to the introduction session, the instructor may (time permitting) add class discussions using the material provided in paragraph 3.4, Dupe Types and Duping Methods.

b.   **Session II: The Checklist Card, Its Use and Contents**

    1.   Checklist card demonstration

         It would be beneficial to show trainees a large image of the checklist card while discussing the subject. Prepare a transparency of the card and show it on a large screen using an overhead projector. Prepare two transparencies, one showing a blank checklist card and the second showing failed answers (to be used in the following session: Failed Checklist Answers.) You might prefer checking off (answering) the questions with an appropriate marker in the sequence they are discussed in class.

2.   Emphasize to the trainees that, to the extent possible, the questions on the checklist card have been designed to be non-intrusive. The questions address specific situations without eliciting personal information about the passenger. For comparison and educational purposes, provide trainees with some examples of intrusive questions such as the following:

(a)   How long have you stayed in the hotel?

(b)   What people have you associated with while you have been in town?

(c)   How did you get to know your friend?

(d)   When was the last time you visited your friend?

(e)   What is the name of your friend?

Inform trainees that while the Security Supervisor conducts a resolution interview, certain questions may occasionally be somewhat intrusive. The PSAs initial interview, however, is structured in a non intrusive manner. These subjects will be discussed in greater detail in sessions IV and V, Resolution Procedures Steps (RPS) and Passenger Interview Guidelines, respectively.

c.   **Session III: Failed Checklist Answers (FCA)**

1.   FCA Meaning

Emphasize to trainees that the name failed checklist answer (FCA) is used merely to indicate that the passenger providing such an answer needs to be subjected to a resolution procedure (interview). It does not mean that the passenger is automatically subjected to additional security measures. In fact, most passengers providing FCAs are expected to be cleared through the interview process.

2.   Passenger inquiries regarding possible FCAs

The checklist card carries a statement for the passenger urging him/her to see a PSA if they have any question relative to completion of the card. Some passengers are expected to have doubts with respect to supplying failed answers. For example, a passenger who borrowed a suitcase from his/her son for the flight may be wondering whether this suitcase should be considered as his/her own property or not. In this example, the passenger perception of family ownership may affect their answers to questions 1 and 3.

d.   **Session IV: Resolution Procedures Steps (RPS)**

1.   PSA role and program integrity

The PSAs role is to ask fixed questions in a specific order. This procedure has been designed to achieve the following goals:

(a)   Simplify PSA role.

(b)   Allow PSA to resolve most common, non-problematic FCAs and maintain consistency in the way cases are transferred from the PSA to the Security Supervisor for resolution.

To avoid disruption in the Dupe Checklist System integrity, PSAs must adhere to their specific responsibilities under the Dupe Checklist Program. For example, PSAs must not initiate additional passenger questioning or make decisions regarding the level of security inspection required. PSAs should be encouraged to submit any relevant input they may have to the Security Supervisor.

2.   Security Supervisor decisions on baggage inspection

In addition to performing resolution procedures (interviews), the Security Supervisor makes decisions regarding the inspection level for passengers' checked baggage and/or items. One critical element in such decisions is the safety issue. The Security Supervisor must decide whether or not a bag is <u>safe to be handled (searched)</u> by the air carrier security personnel. Occasionally the Security Supervisor may determine that a bag cannot be safely handled by the carrier personnel. In such a case the police bomb disposal squad will be summoned to handle the bag inspection.

To illustrate such a scenario consider a passenger carrying a bag that does not belong to him/her, was packed by an unknown individual without the passengers supervision, and was never opened by the passenger. From a security standpoint such a bag should be considered a possible booby-trap, e.g., rigged to explode by the person opening the bag.

e. **Session V: Passenger Interview Guidelines**

1. Leading questions

    For <u>simplification</u> purposes, the preventive questions on the checklist card are structured as leading questions. It would be impractical to request passengers to answer open-ended questions in writing. Most fixed questions listed under the PSA Resolution Procedure Steps (RPS) are open-ended. Some questions (about one third of them) are leading. This is done as a calculated compromise in order to avoid lengthy interviews.

2. Interview and questionable items

    Questionable baggage or items possessed by the passenger should <u>not</u> be opened, unpacked, unwrapped or otherwise searched by the interviewer <u>during</u> PSA and Security Supervisor passenger interview.

    Once the Security Supervisor has concluded that inspection of baggage/items is required, the appropriate Baggage Inspection Level (BIL) will be performed by the proper security entity, i.e., air carrier security personnel, police department or bomb disposal squad.

f. **Session VI: Passenger Interview Demonstration (Video)**

1. Better utilization of video

    Consider showing the video presentation two (or more times) to the trainees in different sessions if time allows. For example, you may show the video presentation after completing Session I (Introduction), and then show it again, as planned, in Session VI. Such multiple presentations have been found to be helpful for some trainees, i.e., help them visualize interview performance during classroom lectures and discussions.

2. Role-playing

    Role-playing has not been incorporated into the Security Supervisor Initial Training due to lack of time. If time is available it would be a good idea to incorporate some role-playing sessions after the video presentation. Refer to the guidelines on how to perform role-playing sessions in the Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Recurrent Training Program.

g. **Session VII: FCA Resolution Outcomes and BILs**

   No comments.

h. **Session VIII: Training Conclusion and Quiz**

   No comments.

3.6   Session VI: Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Recurrent Training Program

LEARNING OBJECTIVE
To provide the instructor with material and directions to maximize recurrent classroom training effectiveness and enhance students interest.
REFERENCE MATERIAL
Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Recurrent Training Program

3.6.1   Preparation

Study the <u>entire</u> Recurrent Training Guide.

3.6.2   General

Paragraph 3.5.7 b. through f. are applicable to this session as well.

3.6.3   Points to Emphasize/Tips/Added Material (Per Session)

a. **Session I: Review and Updates**

   1.   Recent experience

         If the recurrent training is taking place after or while the Dupe Checklist System has been in operation for some time, incorporate into the session a summary of selected actual unique cases of resolution procedures which have been performed at your station. Concentrate on <u>Security</u>

Supervisor resolution steps which are likely to be different from each other. Include discussions about what led the Security Supervisor to reach a certain outcome, i.e., no further action or security inspection of baggage and/or other questionable items. Security inspection results should be discussed as well.

One of the best ways to learn from an experience is to let the actual players (Security Supervisors) tell their stories. Encourage Security Supervisors to share their FCA resolution experiences in front of the class.

You may initiate a discussion on PSA action. However, since PSAs follow identical, fixed procedures, such a discussion may not have a significant educational value.

2.   Definition of terms

If recurrent training is performed prior to the Dupe Checklist System Implementation, define and discuss term definitions. Use the definitions listed in Appendix B of the Instructor's Guide for Security Supervisor Initial Training. Consider giving a copy of the Appendix to each of the trainees, unless an updated RPM (which includes definition of terms) has been distributed to the class participants.

b.   **Session II: Passenger Interview Demonstration (Video)**

1.   Recent experience

Consider skipping the video presentation if all participating Security Supervisors have gained significant recent experience in passenger questioning. In lieu of the presentation perform additional role-playing exercises in Session III.

2.   Updated version

If the recurrent training is conducted while the Dupe Checklist System has not been in place for some time, show the most recently updated version of the video. Time permitting, you may consider showing the presentation twice.

c.   **Session III: Role-playing**

No comments.

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d. **Session IV: Conclusion and Quiz**

No comments.

APPENDIX A

DUPED PASSENGERS - INCIDENTS SYNOPSIS

DUPED PASSENGERS -- INCIDENTS SYNOPSIS

INCIDENTS

		A	B (1)	B (2)	C
1.	Date/period	81-82	1 September 71	17 April 86	28 July 71
2.	Carrier	LY	LY	LY	LY
3.	Flight origin	FRA	LHR	LHR	FCO
4.	Destination	TLV	TLV	TLV	TLV
5.	Passenger's gender	Non-particular	Female	Female	Female
6.	Passenger's age	Non-particular	23	32	18
7.	Passenger's nationality	Non-particular	Peru	U.K. (Irish)	Dutch
8.	Bomb concealment	Not applicable	Inside a suitcase, double bottom (checked baggage)	In a bag's false bottom (checked baggage)	Inside a suitcase, under contents (checked baggage)
9.	Responsible terrorist organization	Unknown	PFLP-GC	Syrian intelligence	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)
10.	Summary	Several attempts were made to give items to passengers at the airport. Passengers refused to accept items and reported the incidents to LY security. Attempts may have been done as dry runs/procedures surveillance.	The woman was sent on a flight to Israel to meet the fictitious parents of her "future husband," who was a member of the PFLP-GC. She was instructed to give the suitcase to the parents in Jerusalem.	The woman was set up for this mission for over a year. As a part of the intelligence scheme, she got engaged to a terrorist. While 6 months pregnant, she was given a ticket to Israel to "meet her fiancé's parents for their wedding arrangements."	This girl was a disowned daughter of a high ranking Dutch army officer and a drug addict. She met a member of the PFLP-GC on a train ride a few months prior to the incident. He became her drug supplier. In exchange for drugs, he gave her a suitcase to deliver to a fictitious friend in Jerusalem.

	Disposition			
11.	Passengers provided descriptions of individuals offering items however none were ever found.	The woman flew on the plane with the suitcase. Because of a technical failure, the bomb did not explode. The woman checked into a hotel in Tel Aviv for the night, where she unsuccessfully tried to unlock the suitcase. She called hotel staff for assistance, who became suspicious and called police. Police discovered the bomb. The woman was investigated, found to be duped and released.	Following procedural pre-board questioning at LHR, the bag was searched and the bomb was discovered. The responsible terrorist (the fiancé) was later arrested, tried and is currently serving a prison sentence in the U.K.	The passenger flew with the suitcase. Because of a technical failure, the bomb did not explode. After failing to locate the suitcase intended "recipient" in Israel, she turned to police for assistance. Police became suspicious, searched the suitcase and discover the bomb. The woman was investigated, found to be duped and released.

DUPED PASSENGERS -- INCIDENTS SYNOPSIS

INCIDENTS

		D	E	F
1.	Date/period	21 April 80	16 August 72	During 1981 -1982
2.	Carrier	LY	LY	N/A
3.	Flight origin	ZRH	FCO	Throughout Africa
4.	Destination	TLV	TLV	N/A
5.	Passenger's gender	Male	Two females	N/A
6.	Passenger's age	25	Both 18	N/A
7.	Passenger's nationality	German	Both British	N/A
8.	Bomb concealment	In a suitcase's sides (checked baggage)	Inside a turntable audio device (checked baggage)	Not Applicable
9.	Responsible terrorist organization	Wadia Hadad group (a small Palestinian Organization)	PFLP-GC	PLO
10.	Summary	The passenger was made to believe he was involved in illegal diamond deal.	Several weeks prior to date of flight, the passenger met two male individuals; members of the PFLP-GC. The passenger became close friends of the two individuals. The turntable was given to them as a gift for a friend in Israel. The passengers were instructed not to talk to anyone regarding the "gift." or they would have to pay a high customs fee	A series of attempts were made to win concession contracts at several airports throughout Africa (multiple in Nairobi) by "foreigners".

11.	Disposition	Following procedural pre-board questioning, at ZRH, the suitcase was searched and a the bomb was discovered.	Bomb exploded minutes after take-off but the aircraft was able to return to and land safely at the airport. One passenger was injured. The responsible terrorists escaped Italy. The females were arrested, released on bail, and disappeared a few months later.	After the African Government began investigating the "foreign interests" in the airport concessions, all bidding stopped and the investors disappeared. The "investors" were later identified as PLO members.